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Class Conflicts of Law II:
Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the Deep
Agenda of the Obama NLRB
JAMES GRAY POPEt
On his first day in office, President Barack Obama
elevated Wilma B. Liebman to the Chairmanship of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). Now in
the middle of her third six-year term on the Board, Liebman
has developed strong views about its recent and future
direction. During the months leading up to her elevation,
she published an article and delivered a series of scholarly
speeches hammering away on the theme that-in her
memorable phrase-American labor law had been "turned
inside out" by the Bush Board.' At the Twenty-fifth
Anniversary Retrospective on James Atleson's Values and
Assumptions in American Labor Law,2 she explained this
phenomenon in stark terms. Business values drawn from
outside the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), she
charged, now routinely trump the workers' statutory rights
to organize and engage in concerted activities for mutual
aid or protection. Employee rights have yielded to the
employer's property interest in a "scrap of paper," to
considerations of "civility and decorum," and to business
interests that were not claimed by the parties. As a result,
the limitations and exceptions to the workers' statutory
t Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of
Law, Newark, New Jersey. This Essay is proudly dedicated to James B. Atleson,
whose work galvanized and continues to inspire a generation of labor lawyers
and scholars. The author would like to thank Marion Crain, Kenneth Dau-
Schmidt, Alan Hyde, Richard Michael Fischl, Maria Ontiveros, and Ahmed
White for an exceptionally useful set of criticisms and suggestions.
1. Wilma B. Liebman, Labor Law Inside Out, 11 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. &
SOC'Y 9, 10 (2008) [hereinafter Liebman, Labor Law]. Liebman delivered
speeches on this theme in New York City on May 11, 2008, and in Buffalo on
September 18, 2008. See Wilma B. Liebman, Speech, Values and Assumptions of
the Bush NLRB: Trumping Workers' Rights, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 648 (2009)
[hereinafter Liebman, Values].




rights have become "central focus," while the rights
themselves have been relegated to the periphery The
drumbeat of decisions accomplishing this transformation
has been so relentless as to constitute "class warfare by one
side."
The present Essay takes Liebman's "inside out" metaphor
as its starting point and asks three questions. First, how
have business values-imported from outside the NLRA-
moved to the center of labor jurisprudence? Second, how
have labor values-enshrined at the core of the NLRA in
the Section 7 rights of "self-organization" and "concerted
activity for . . . mutual aid or protection"4-- drifted to the
periphery? Third and finally, how can labor values be
restored to their proper place at the center of the labor law?
The Essay proposes the following, admittedly partial
answers.' First, business values gravitated to the center of
the labor law because they were grounded on a positive,
coherent, and deeply rooted juristic understanding of
business entrepreneurship. Second, labor values drifted to
the periphery because they were not anchored to any
comparably positive, coherent, or widely understood core
theory or narrative of labor activity. Third, labor values can
be restored to their rightful place at the center of the labor
law by revitalizing the positive vision of labor activity that
prevailed at the time the NLRA was enacted, namely that
worker self-organization and concerted activity hinges on
the generation of solidarity-an ongoing process that begins
before union organization, continues afterward, and
3. Liebman, Values, supra note 1, at 647-48.
4. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
5. The answers are partial because they address the problem only at the
level of legal thought. One could say, and I would not disagree, that the labor
law has been turned inside out because workers and unions suffered a series of
disastrous political and economic defeats over the past six decades, and that the
law can be turned right-side out only by a series of victories on a comparable
scale. However, I am not claiming that the absence of a core theory of labor
values caused the labor law to be turned inside out, or that the recognition of
such a core theory will reverse that development. My claim is that the absence
of a core theory systematically weakened the efforts of judges and NLRB
members to enforce the workers' statutory rights, and that the recognition of
such a core theory will substantially improve the prospects of turning the labor
law right-side out. To put it another way, political and economic developments
create opportunities for juristic change; those opportunities are realized or
squandered in part based on the quality of the contending legal strategies and
theories.
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conflicts fundamentally with the currently prevalent view
that labor freedom consists of individual workers making
rationally self-interested choices to vote for union
representation or engage in concerted activity.
That positive vision was recently honored by President
Obama on the same day that he elevated Liebman to the
Chairmanship. In his inaugural address, the President
observed that "it is ultimately the faith and determination
of the American people upon which this nation relies," and
gave as an example "the selflessness of workers who would
rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job."6 On
another occasion, he used the same example to illustrate
"what is best in America."' As Obama undoubtedly knew,
workers collectively cutting their hours to prevent layoffs is
a time-honored tradition of labor solidarity! Consider this
account, by a union organizer, of work sharing at a
Connecticut factory called F-Dyne Electronic:
Under the contract, the layoffs went according to seniority. We felt
terrible, thinking of some of the workers who would be put out on
the street. There was a Portuguese woman named Albertina who
had little children. She was crying, but she said, "It's OK. It's all
right." The other women said, 'That's unfair."
6. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html.
7. Presidential Candidate Barack Obama, Speech on the Economy in




8. See, e.g., GARY GERSTLE, WORKING-CLASs AMERICANISM: THE POLITICS OF
LABOR IN A TEXTILE CITY, 1914-1960, at 143, 145 (1989) (describing the work-
sharing practices of the Independent Textile Union in Woonsocket, Rhode
Island); CARL D. OBLINGER, DIVIDED KINGDOM 20-21 (2d ed. 2004) (describing
work-sharing demands by Illinois bituminous coal miners); Thomas Dublin, The
Equalization of Work: An Alternative Vision of Capitalism in the Anthracite
Region of Pennsylvania in the 1930s, 13 CANAL HIST. & TECH. PROC. 81, 86-87,
91-92 (1994); Mia Giunta, Working-Class People Have a Very Deep Culture
Based on Solidarity and Trust, in THE NEW RANK AND FILE 31, 36-37 (Staughton
Lynd & Alice Lynd eds., 2000) (describing work-sharing at a Connecticut
electronics factory in the 1980s).
I am indebted to Staughton Lynd for suggesting citations. He also recounts
his own experience at Northeast Ohio Legal Services, where the lawyers
reduced their hours to four days per week in response to a twenty percent
budget cut imposed by President Ronald Reagan. The lawyers did not ask anything
of the secretarial staff, believing that they were underpaid to begin with.
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When the next bunch of layoffs came along, somebody suggested,
'"e'll all work a few hours less each week. That way everybody
can stay. Everybody will have health insurance." And .. .that
became the tradition in that factory.
9
This story illustrates distinctive dynamics of labor
solidarity that are centrally important to worker self-
organization and concerted activity, but have nevertheless
been ignored or downplayed in American labor law. The
tradition of work-sharing resulted from a collective decision-
making process that bore little or no relation to the model of
self-interested rational choice that currently dominates
labor jurisprudence. Part I of this Essay suggests that work
sharing and other solidaristic norms arise out of a culture of
labor solidarity, developed by workers in opposition to the
employer-promoted culture of rationally self-interested
competition for employer approval. The conflict is so intense
as to amount to a "culture war" in which workers self-
identify either as seekers of individual gain (as opposed to
idealistic chumps) or as union sisters and brothers (as
opposed to scabs). When judges and NLRB members
conceptualize workers as rationally self-interested market
actors, they take the employer's side in this culture war.
Part II examines the theoretical dimension of the
workplace culture war. It suggests that the model of
decision-making as self-interested rational choice, which
works well in an entrepreneurial context, does not fit the
industrial relations context. Instead, it is the alternative
model of "constitutive" decision-making that best describes
the choice for or against self-organization and concerted
activity. Instead of choosing whether to "purchase" union
services, workers join together to enact and enforce norms
of solidarity. This process typically begins before union
recognition and, as in the case of the work-sharing norm at
F-Dyne, continues afterward.
Part III traces the historical origins of unilateral worker
norm creation and enforcement. Drawing on the work of
John R. Commons, it depicts a pre-NLRA baseline not of
exclusive employer control (a baseline that is said to justify
the notion of reserved management rights), but of a
competition between unilaterally created employer norms
grounded on entrepreneurship, and unilaterally created
worker norms grounded on solidarity.
9. Giunta, supra note 8, at 36-37.
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Part IV suggests that the NLRA was meant to endorse
and incorporate worker-made norms of solidarity. It finds
scattered elements of a juridical understanding of solidarity
in past decisions of the Board and courts. Part V proposes
changes in labor law doctrine that might result if those
elements were assembled and expanded into a core theory
and narrative of labor activity. Part VI focuses specifically
on the current status and future prospects for a labor
counterpart to the doctrine of the core of entrepreneurial
control.
I should note at the outset that, according to the
philosophy underlying our labor statutes, gains for solidarity
need not come at the expense of entrepreneurship. The
claim that norms and practices of solidarity should be
central to American labor law in no way conflicts with a
recognition that entrepreneurship is central to prosperity.
Solidarity can both prevent the perversion of
entrepreneurship into aristocratic arrogance, and ensure
that the wealth generated by the combination of
entrepreneurial initiative and productive labor are fairly
distributed. Genuine entrepreneurship, as opposed to the
shameless sense of entitlement recently exhibited by many
corporate leaders, can thrive without the "inequality of
bargaining power" that results when workers "do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract.""°
Finally, I should acknowledge that this Essay has its
origin in James B. Atleson's Values and Assumptions in
American Labor Law. In the midst of criticizing the doctrine
of entrepreneurial control, Atleson floated the notion of a
"core of union concern."" When I read the book as a law
student in 1983, this idea triggered a question in my mind-
one that I have pondered ever since. Why, given that the
NLRA protects workers' rights and does not so much as
mention employer property rights, have courts and the
NLRB developed a doctrine protecting the "core of
10. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). For an economic explanation of the
compatibility of entrepreneurialism and economic efficiency with collective labor
rights, see Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor Law and Employment Regulation:
Neoclassical and Institutional Perspectives, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, S. Harris and O.Lobel eds., forthcoming
2009).
11. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 131.
2009] 657
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entrepreneurial control" while neglecting to develop a labor
counterpart? And, if they were to develop such a counterpart,
what would be the labor equivalent of entrepreneurship? It
is my hope that the answers proposed here will provide a
modest illustration of the continuing vitality of Values and
Assumptions as a generator of ideas today, a quarter
century after its initial publication.
I. THE WORKPLACE CULTURE WAR BETWEEN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOLIDARITY
The "core of entrepreneurial control" is a well-known
doctrine in labor law. Justice Potter Stewart coined the
phrase as a label for matters that, despite their direct and
sometimes devastating impact on employees, are not among
those "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment" over which employers and unions must
bargain. 2  The doctrine liberates employers to make
decisions about matters that are said to be at the core of
entrepreneurial control-for example capital investment
and the basic "scope of an enterprise"-free from union
economic pressure and the statutory obligation to bargain in
good faith with the unions representing their employees. 3
The doctrine provides the focal point for a coherent and
positive conception of employer interests that has come to
permeate the labor law." The term "entrepreneurial"-as
contrasted with "managerial" or "administrative"--captures
distinctive functions of business management that are
widely valued in society and considered to be outside the
expertise of unions: conceiving, shaping, and accepting the
12. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
13. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 684 (1981). Unions are
prohibited from striking over matters at the core of entrepreneurial control, and
employers may implement decisions on such matters without notifying or
bargaining with the union. See, e.g., Id.; NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S.342, 349 (1958); ATLESON, supra note 2, at 115, 133-34.
14. See generally ATLESON, supra note 2. This kind of thinking operates to
shrink the scope of workers' rights. In NLRB v. Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard),
for example, a group of broadcast technicians who criticized a television
station's programming found themselves outside the statutory protection for
"concerted activity" partly because they were commenting on matters for
which-in the words of the Supreme Court-"management, not technicians,
must be responsible." 346 U.S. 464, 476 (1953).
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risks of operating a business enterprise." Demonstrating
the weightiness of entrepreneurial interests, the doctrine
trumps competing concerns, for example the interest of
workers in protecting their jobs from destruction due to
plant closings or other capital investment decisions. 6
The core theory and narrative of entrepreneurship is so
compelling that it has the capacity to generate official
protection for business interests that are not even claimed
by the parties. In First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, the authoritative decision on the core of
entrepreneurial control, the Supreme Court hypothesized a
host of possible employer interests in unilateral control over
partial closing decisions, including "great need for speed,
flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities
and exigencies," need to control timing for tax and securities
reasons, and need to avoid publicity that might disrupt the
transition.'7 As Atleson pointed out, however "none of these
interests was implicated" in First National.' On the other
hand, all are consistent with the standard narrative, deeply
embedded in our culture, of the creative and resourceful
entrepreneur developing a business strategy, committing
capital, and accepting the risk of failure as well as the
prospect of gain. Publically at oral argument, and privately
in their internal deliberations, the Justices evinced a strong
concern for the liberty of the employer to control
investment-related decisions regardless of their impact on
workers.'9 The doctrinal result was a balancing test that
gave heavy weight to the employer's interests while failing
to mention the workers' interests at all: "[I]n view of an
15. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 597
(4th ed. 2000) (defining "entrepreneur" as a "person who organizes, operates,
and assumes the risk for a business venture").
16. Fibreboard Paper, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring); see First
Nat7 Maint., 452 U.S. 666; ATLESON, supra note 2, at 126, 133-34.
17. 452 U.S. at 682-83.
18. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 134.
19. Alan Hyde, The Story of First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB:
Eliminating Bargaining for Low-Wage Service Workers, in LABOR LAw STORIES
282, 297-305 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (reporting
concerns at oral argument about the liberty of the employer who wanted to
move operations overseas or simply would "rather spend his money in Florida
than where he was," and recounting efforts by Justice Powell to modify the
opinion so as to provide categorical protection for employers against strikes by
workers seeking to prevent the elimination of jobs).
2009] 659
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employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that . . . [eliminate
jobs] should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business."20  Ironically, the actual motivation of the
employer-revealed afterwards by its attorney-was to
prevent the "virus" of union organization from spreading to
other facilities.2'
Given that the NLRA protects workers' rights and says
nothing at all about employer property rights, one might
expect to find a labor counterpart to the core theory and
narrative of business entrepreneurship. Labor law
systematically pits the common law rights of employers,
which pre-existed the NLRA, against the statutory rights of
workers.2 2 On the employer side, business values--openly
endorsed and heavily weighted in the doctrine of
entrepreneurial control-infuse employer common law
rights with vitality. But on the labor side, one searches in
vain for a corresponding theory or narrative of labor
activity. When it comes time to balance employer common-
law rights against workers' statutory rights, the employer's
robust and coherent entrepreneurial interest is
counterbalanced by a scattering of disconnected interests
many of which are neutral in valence like employee "choice"
or "stability in collective bargaining. '23 Where labor's
counterpart to the core of entrepreneurial control would
logically lie, we find instead a feeble doctrine that protects
unilateral union control only over "strictly internal union
matters" like union dues and the selection of union
officials.24 The words of the NLRA remain, including not
20. 452 U.S. at 679.
21. Hyde, supra note 19, at 291.
22. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 9-10.
23. See, e.g., Liebman, Labor Law, supra note 1, at 9; see also supra note 20
and accompanying text.
24. Quality House of Graphics, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 497, 508 (2002) (internal
union fund). See, e.g., Int'l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 306
N.L.R.B. 229, 235 (1992) (amount of union dues); Torrington Indus., Inc., 307
N.L.R.B. 809 (1992) (selection of grievance representative); Soc. Servs. Union
Local 535, 287 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1988) (amount of union's "agency fees" non-
mandatory), enforced in 905 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1990); ROBERT A. GORMAN &
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 698, 702-11 (2d ed. 2004). The fount of this doctrine is NLRB v.
660 [Vol. 57
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only the specification of the various workers' rights but also
-as pro-labor commentators never tire of pointing out-
the official policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining."2 But there is no positive juristic
concept or standard narrative of worker self-organization
and concerted activity.
In their absence, legal decision-makers rely on
analogies and standard narratives drawn from the market
in commodities, the institutional home of entrepreneurship.
Lacking a notion of what it means to engage in "self-
organization," judges and NLRB members imagine each
worker as a consumer, making an isolated, one-shot choice
for or against unionized employment relations-a choice
best made under "laboratory conditions."26  Lacking a
concept of "mutual aid or protection," they envision each
worker as a self-interested trader, bartering assistance now
for assistance in the future.27  Lacking a concept of
"concerted activity" or of "collective bargaining," they
imagine concerted and collective labor activity on a business
model-tied to the presence or absence of a formally
recognized, unitary institution that subsumes natural
persons into an artificial legal entity-parallel to the
corporation-namely, a union that has been recognized as
the exclusive bargaining representative.28
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), which held that
unions enjoy the freedom to act unilaterally on matters involving "relations
between the employees and their unions" as opposed to relations between
employees and employer. Id. at 350.
25. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
26. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948); cf. Matthew T. Bodie,
Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 37-38
(2008) (characterizing the choice for union representation as a "purchase-of-
services").
27. Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and
Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 789, 793-814 (1989).
28. See, e.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (overruling Board's
previous rule that workers in non-union workplaces enjoyed a right to have a co-
worker present at a meeting that might result in discipline); Cindy Skrzycki, A
Renewed Bid For Mini- Unions, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2007, at D1 (reporting on
advice memo, issued by NLRB Associate General Counsel Barry Kearney,
maintaining that in a workplace with no exclusive bargaining representative,
employers have no duty to bargain with representatives chosen by their
workers); cf. Bodie, supra note 26, at 41 (analogizing unions to commercial
nonprofit corporations).
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None of this would be legally objectionable if the statute
adopted a market model of workers' rights. But the reverse
is true. In the context of industrial relations, the market
perspective is the partisan perspective of anti-union
employers, legally sanctioned not in the statute but in the
pre-NLRA common law. When workers think of themselves
as consumers of union services or traders of support, they
adopt a perspective that conflicts fundamentally with the
philosophy underlying the social practices that are labeled
by the statute as "self-organization" and "mutual aid." The
choice to self-organize or to engage in concerted activity is a
choice to reject individual market competition in favor of
group advancement. If individual workers adopt the
mindset of consumers or traders-who seek to maximize
individual gain in each transaction-then they are likely to
free-ride, shirk, or defect. 9 Accordingly, unions and labor
activists engage in a culture war with employers, struggling
to replace individual calculations of self-interest with a
generalized commitment to mutual support. Slogans like"solidarity forever" and "an injury to one is an injury to all"
reflect this effort. In the movement culture of labor, workers
see themselves not as rationally self-interested consumers
of unionism or traders of support, but as "sisters" and
"brothers" bound together by workplace community, trade,
industry, and class. In sharp contrast to the monolithic
business corporation, unions are more-or-less democratic
associations of workers that exist to propagate solidarity,
enforce norms of solidarity, and parlay the collective power
thus forged into gains for workers.3 °
29. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1965). From the
perspective of individual "choice," as Liebman points out, "Workers may view
the employment relationship in purely individual terms and may fail to grasp
common economic interests and the potential of collective action at work, as well
as in the public sphere." Liebman, Labor Law, supra note 1, at 20; see also
CLAUSE OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM 183-84 (1985).
30. See generally RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS,
ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN WORKERS (1988); OFFE, supra note 29, at
170-207
662 [Vol. 57
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II. THE THEORETICAL DIMENSION OF THE CULTURE WAR:
RATIONAL VERSUS CONSTITUTIVE CHOICE
Unfortunately, as Liebman has observed, NLRB members
and judges evince a profound "discomfort with collective
action and the zeal that often accompanies collective
action."'" This discomfort will not be overcome if the
alternative to rationally self-interested choice is irrationally
altruistic choice. But the alternative to rational choice is not
irrational choice. Nobody denies that the choice for
unionism can be economically rational at the collective
level; the difficulty for workers lies in how to make the shift
from individually to collectively constructed interests.32 This
shift is best modeled not economically, as "rational choice,"
but cognitively, as "constitutive" choice. Consider first the
model of rational choice, which envisions individuals
making instrumental choices about action in a three-stage
process. Individuals (1) identify their goals or preferences,
(2) consider alternative courses of action, and (3) select the
alternative that maximizes goal attainment.33 In choosing
whether to follow a norm of solidarity rather than one of
individualism workers compare the costs and benefits of
each. They join unions when "the increased wages and
benefits resulting from unions' bargaining advantages
exceed union dues and other cooperation costs." Once
established in a workplace, a union can-at least
theoretically-solve free-rider problems by providing
31. Liebman, Values, supra note 1.
32. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law
and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH L REV. 419,
at 446-48, 493 (1992) (analyzing employee organization as a public good and
discussing the divergence of individual and collective interests in public goods);
Alan Hyde, Endangered Species, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 456, 471 (1991) (observing
that worker collective action hinges on workers shifting out of the rational
choice mode to a different logic of collective action, and citing sources); Benjamin
I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2722-27
(2008) (concluding, based on sociological scholarship, that the capacity for
effective group action hinges on (1) the ability of group members to frame
interests and solutions in collective terms and (2) the construction of a collective
identity).
33. See Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and
Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
475, 477 (summarizing the views of rational choice theorists).
34. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 143 (1996).
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selective incentives, for example threatening workers who
refuse to participate with expulsion or fines.
Unfortunately for worker self-organization, however,
the rational choice model provides no "rational" way for
workers to begin challenging the employer's norm of
individual competition. 36 Before a new norm can become
dominant, numerous individuals must choose to defy the old
norm and begin enforcing the new. For the first few "norm
entrepreneurs," the costs of challenging the old norm are
immediate and highly probable to occur, while the benefits
are distant and speculative. At the beginning of a norm
shift, the old norm's enforcers-who have yet to be
weakened by defections--can concentrate all their efforts on
the first few proponents of the new norm. Retaliation is
likely to be swift and damaging. It is estimated that for
every five workers who vote union in a secret ballot
representation election, one suffers discharge in
retaliation.37 Meanwhile, on the benefit side of the equation,
norms are subject to "lock-in" effects. Since the value of a
norm to any individual tends to depend heavily on whether
it is followed by others, a new norm that is honored by only
a few people is not likely to appear as an attractive
alternative. Thus, each individual worker has an incentive
to delay committing herself to the new norm until a critical
mass of others has already made the leap.3" If workers make
35. Id. at 143.
36. Rational choice theory has long had problems explaining why anyone
would choose to be the first, or among the first, to stand up to power. Early
adherents of the model were cognizant of this limitation and acknowledged that
their model did not account for an important segment of leaders. In his famous
study of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, for example, Samuel Popkin
conceded that many leading activists "wanted only to help their country" and "to
work for freedom and independence." Prefiguring the constitutive model, he
observed that they were "not stimulated by any expectation of future selective
payoff," but by "internalized feelings of duty or ethic." SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 220,
223 (1979).
37. Lindsay Beyerstein, Economist: One in Five Union Organizers Gets Canned,
WASH. INDEP., Jan. 14, 2009, available at http'/washingtonindependent.com/
25398/economist-one-in-five-union-organizers-gets-canned (reporting study by
the Center for Economic Policy Institute). The study utilized methods developed
by analysts at the University of Chicago and applied them to data collected by
the NLRB.
38. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813, 833-36 (1998); see also Sachs, supra, note 32, at 2738-43.
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decisions in accord with the rational choice model, then, it is
unlikely that anybody will choose to step forward and
support self-organization in its early stages. This helps to
explain why employers support the model of rational choice
so strongly, and why unionists resist it.
While the problem of activism tends to confound
rational choice theory, it is easily explained by constitutive
models of decision-making. Here, instead of calculating
costs and benefits, individuals probe the meaning of action.
They construct personal identities, take account of social
roles, and make normative commitments. Again, a three-
step process leads to action, as individuals ask: (1) "What
kind of situation is this?"; (2) "What kind of person am I?";
and (3) What is appropriate for a person like me in a
situation like this?" If a worker who is considering self-
organization answers question number two by concluding
that she is "a rational market actor-not a chump who falls
for emotional appeals," then the answer to number three
will likely be to avoid the risk of retaliation that comes with
union activism, secure in the knowledge that if the union
prevails she will receive the increased wages, benefits, and
job protection anyway. But if the worker concludes that she
is the kind of person who stands by her co-workers-that
she is a union sister or brother, not a free-rider or scab-
then she will likely assist in an organizing effort that has
decent prospects of success. The constitutive model helps to
explain why the initiators of self-organization and concerted
activity tend to be distinguished by familial or experiential
connections to traditions of unionism and solidarity.
Far from demonstrating irrationality, the choice for
solidarity reflects a prioritization of values or, in
economists' terms, satisfactions. Drawing on Harry
Frankfurt's notion of "second-order preferences," Albert 0.
Hirschman explains that although a person might have a
(first-order) preference for free-riding, she might also have a
(second-order) preference about that preference-for
example, a desire not to be the kind of person who takes
free rides on the efforts of others.' An individual may tire of
the demands and satisfactions of first-order, private-
39. JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: How DECISIONS
HAPPEN 58 (1994).
40. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND
PUBLIC ACTION 3-8, 86 (1982).
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oriented preferences and switch to second-order,
collectively-oriented ones. No longer does she approach each
decision by considering the costs and benefits to her of
cooperating or free-riding. Instead, she commits herself to
follow the social norm of solidarity. Thus, the meta-choice to
move from first- to second-order satisfactions entails a shift
from self-interested, instrumental decision-making
consistent with the market model to norm-driven decision-
making consistent with the constitutive model."
This shift has been dramatized in film and literature. In
the movie Norma Rae, for example, a young textile worker
of that name is fired for leading the organizing effort at a
large mill. As she is escorted out through a room full of
thundering machines, she scrawls "UNION" on a piece of
cardboard and holds it high over her head while standing on
a table. The managers and the operators stare. Then, one
operator throws the switch to kill her machine. After
awhile, another follows. Tension mounts as everyone
wonders whether more will join in. Each worker risks
discipline or more subtle retaliation if she does, and the
benefits of the job action are unclear. Even if it somehow
contributes to unionization, the resulting benefits will be
enjoyed by all without regard to participation. Yet, operator
after operator shuts down, and a deafening silence ensues.
Regardless of its immediate impact on the employer (none,
apparently, as Norma is eventually arrested and led out by
the sheriff) the action has demonstrated the capacity of the
workers both to embrace solidarity in the face of
individualized counter-incentives, and to engage in combined
action that has the potential to offset employer power.42
41. Id.; see also Hyde, supra note 32, at 471; Sachs, supra note 32, at 2722-
27.
42. NORMA RAE (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1979). A similar job
action by tirebuilders is recounted in Ruth McKenny's novel, Industrial Valley.
After the machines stopped, the "tirebuilders stood in long lines, touching each
other, perfectly motionless, deafened by the silence .... Out of the terrifying
quiet came the wondering voice of a big tirebuilder near the windows: 'Jesus
Christ, it's like the end of the world.' He broke the spell, the magic moment of
stillness. For now his awed words said the same thing to every man, 'We done it!
We stopped the belt! By God, we done it!' And men began to cheer hysterically,
to shout and howl in the fresh silence. . . . 'John Brown's body,' somebody
chanted above the cries. The others took it up. 'But his soul,' they sang, and
some of them were nearly weeping, racked with sudden and deep emotion, 'but
his soul goes marchin' on."' RUTH McKENNY, INDUSTRIAL VALLEY 261-62 (1939).
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As long as courts and NLRB members frame workers'
rights in an individualistic, market vocabulary drawn from
the business side of the culture war, employer interests will
shape both sides of the labor law balance. The assumption
of rational choice entails the rejection of solidarity.
Conversely, if the NLRB were to embrace a positive
understanding of solidarity as labor's counterpart to
business entrepreneurship, new light would be shed on
many, crucially important legal issues. A number of those
issues are discussed in Parts IV and V below, but first it will
be useful to correct the historical record on the origins of
entrepreneurship and solidarity in labor law.
III. THE HISTORICAL GENESIS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
SOLIDARITY IN LABOR LAw
Courts, NLRB members, and labor arbitrators justify
the zone of unilateral employer control by firmly asserting
what Atleson calls a '"Genesis' view" of industrial relations.
In the beginning, the story goes, management enjoyed the
exclusive right to direct all aspects of the enterprise. Then,
management's rights came to be limited in some respects by
collective bargaining agreements and government
regulation. Nevertheless (and here's the kicker),
management retains all rights that have not been restricted
by such agreements or regulation. "The power of an
employer," concludes Atleson, "is analogized to a state,
having all powers not expressly restricted in the state's
constitution.""
Only one problem. The firmness of the Genesis claims
"is only overcome," as Atleson wryly notes, "by the extent of
their historical inaccuracy."45 When we look back in time for
the Genesis baseline of unchallenged employer control, we
find that it never existed. Instead, we see two regimes in
conflict: one of unilateral employer control and one of
unilateral worker control. Prior to modern collective
bargaining, unions unilaterally enacted rules governing a
wide range of subjects including wages, hours, workplace
43. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 122.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 122-23.
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safety and production methods.46  The scope and
effectiveness of worker control varied hugely by industry,
occupation, geographic location, and time period, but the
overall picture was one of competing employer and worker
jurisdictions, and not of unbounded employer control. As
Atleson points out, for example, organized craft workers in
the basic steel industry exercised unilateral control over
many aspects of the production process. Later, the steel
corporations broke the unions, but that was a result of
political, economic, and paramilitary struggles culminating
in the Homestead strike of 1892, and not of any natural
tendency toward employer authority.47 Other unions, for
example the International Typographical Union, continued
to exercise strict control even over what would now be
considered management functions.48 Less ambitiously, local
unions of coal miners unilaterally enacted rules governing
safety conditions, requiring work sharing to avoid layoffs,
and barring members from working with miners who were
not in good standing with the union. Even non-union,
unskilled workers seized every opportunity to legislate
limits on the pace of work.
From a "Genesis" point of view, then, there were two
zones of unilateral control-not one-prior to modern
collective bargaining. Writing about a decade before the
NLRA was enacted, leading labor scholar John R. Commons
described these zones as conflicting common law regimes
and identified the core values of each. On the one hand, the
employers' "historic common law springing from the
customs of merchants and manufacturers" fostered
46. See James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law I: Unilateral Worker
Lawmaking versus Unilateral Employer Lawmaking in the U.S. Workplace, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 1095, 1098-1103 (2008) (citing historical sources).
47. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 123; Katherine Stone, The Origins of Job
Structures in the Steel Industry, in LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION 27, 33-34
(Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich & David M. Gordon eds., 1975).
48. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN TRow & JAMES COLEMAN, UNION
DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL
UNION 24-26 (1956); Benson Soffer, A Theory of Trade Union Development: The
Role of the 'Autonomous" Workman, 1 LAB. HIST. 141, 152-53 (1960) (observing
that the "laws" of the iron workers' and typographers' unions "gave them
unilateral powers over management functions").
49. For documentation, see James Gray Pope, The Western Pennsylvania
Coal Strike of 1933, Part I: Lawmaking from Below and the Revival of the




"[finitiative, enterprise, ambition, [and] individual
succcess"-all virtues associated with entrepreneurship."
By contrast, the workers' "common law of labor springing
from the customs of wage earners" rested on the core values
of solidarity and fairness.5 While entrepreneurship yielded
success in business, solidarity provided essential "protection
against the economic power of employers."52
Courts enthusiastically embraced the common law of
business which, by the time of the NLRA, they had been
"defining and classifying for some 300 years."53 By contrast,
courts looked with suspicion upon solidarity. "Initiative,
enterprise, ambition, individual success, are quite contrary
to the rules of solidarity and fair competition that
characterize gilds and unions," explained Commons. 4 "It is
the judge who believes in the law and custom of business
and not the judge who believes in the law and custom of
labor, that decides."55 Courts could see no purpose to unions
'beyond the supposed desirability of leveling inequalities of
fortune"'-an objective that they considered illegitimate and
unconstitutional. 6 While workers insisted that solidarity
was necessary to prevent economic coercion by employers,
courts denied that a grown man of sound mind could be
economically-as opposed to physically-coerced. 7 To the
extent that the workers' common law had won official
recognition, it was through legislation-for example laws
banning yellow dog contracts and labor injunctions.
50. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 305 (1924).
51. Id. at 304; see also DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
LABOR 171 (1987) (observing that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries "the
ideology of acquisitive individualism, which explained and justified a society
regulated by market mechanisms and propelled by the accumulation of capital,
was challenged by an ideology of mutualism, rooted in working-class bondings
and struggles").
52. COMMONS, supra note 50, at 304.
53. Id. at 305. In particular, courts protected management decisions about
capital investment by means of labor injunctions. ATLESON, supra note 2, at 127-
28.
54. COMMONS, supra note 50, at 305.
55. Id. at 298.
56. Id. at 293 (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18 (1915) (invalidating
state statute that prohibited yellow dog contracts as a violation of constitutional
property and contract rights)).




Unfortunately for workers, judges had struck down such
legislation as unconstitutional, or narrowed it by
construction. 8
On the eve of the NLRA, then, the common law of
entrepreneurship was well-established in judicial opinions,
while the workers' common law of solidarity was, as
Commons observed, "seeking recognition."59
IV. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR SOLIDARITY
UNDER THE NLRA
As enacted, the NLRA did appear to incorporate the
workers' common law. Section 7 guaranteed the right of
workers to engage in "concerted activities for .. mutual aid
or protection,"6  a phrase that referred to the labor
movement's core principle of mutualism and solidarity.6 In
a direct repudiation of the judge-made common law, the Act
condemned "[tihe inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract and employers" and affirmed that
"the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively"
was necessary to restore "equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.""
Labor's equivalent to business entrepreneurship is the
generation of solidarity. While entrepreneurs raise and
invest capital, labor activists create and sustain norms of
solidarity. Just as capital is the key to creating and shaping
a business, solidarity is the key to fostering any form of
worker "self-organization" or "concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection." What is needed, then, is a juridical
understanding of the generation of solidarity that is
comparable-at least within the sphere of labor law-to the
juridical understanding of entrepreneurship. First and
foremost, this understanding must take into account the
dynamics of norm creation and enforcement, a subject that
58. See COMMONS, supra note 50, at 298, 304-05; WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 37-58 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1991).
59. COMMONS, supra note 50, at 307.
60. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
61. See Fischl, supra note 27, at 850-51.
62. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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has attracted considerable attention in legal scholarship.63
Elements of such an understanding appear in a number of
scattered court and NLRB decisions.
In the familiar and foundational case of J.i. Case Co. v.
NLRB,' for example, the Supreme Court read the NLRA to
incorporate the core principle of the workers' common law.
The employer had executed individual, written employment
contracts with most of its employees. When a union was
certified as exclusive bargaining representative, the
company claimed that it could not agree to any collectively
bargained terms that would conflict with the individual
contracts. The Court held that the contracts could not bar or
limit collective bargaining. After acknowledging that some
individual workers might gain advantages over and above
collectively negotiated standards, the Court explained that
"[t]he practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks
with suspicion on such individual advantages," which may
be "earned at the cost of breaking down some other
standard thought to be for the welfare of the group."65 This
characterization of the "practice and philosophy of collective
bargaining" encapsulated the workers' core principle of
solidarity in bargaining, according to which workers would
advance together and not in competition with one another.
Instead of imagining its own view of a rational worker's
choice, as the NLRB and the courts would later come to do,
the Court deferred to the union principle. Only the Court's
failure to acknowledge the true source of the principle-not
in some neutral notion of "collective bargaining," but in the
workers' common law developed in opposition to the
employers' common law-did J.I. Case hint at the future
conceptual void on the workers' rights side of labor law
balancing.
63. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure.
Salary? No Way" Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 167, 175-76 (2004); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:
The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv.
L. REv. 1003 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 1697 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
64. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
65. Id. at 338.
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In NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates
Company,66 the Board reinstated a worker who had been
discharged by a candy manufacturer for supporting a strike
of dairy farmers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the reinstatement, rejecting the employer's
argument that because the worker did not benefit from the
dairy farmers' strike, his action was not for "mutual aid or
protection" as required by the statute. In a famous passage,
Judge Learned Hand rejected this view on the ground that
when workers
in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his
separate grievance .... [they] know that by their action each one
of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the
support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the
solidarity so established is 'mutual aid' in the most literal sense,
as nobody doubts.
67
By "the solidarity so established," Hand meant the
workers' norm of solidarity and not a tit-for-tat promise
among the individuals involved.68 By itself, the "support of
the one whom they are all helping" would have been of little
use to the workers. Their strike fostered not solely his
obligation to help them in the future, but also the duty of
each worker in the shop to support the others. This reading
is confirmed by Hand's next sentence: "So too of those
engaging in a 'sympathetic strike,' or secondary boycott; the
immediate quarrel does not itself concern them, but by
extending the number of those who will make the enemy of
one the enemy of all, the power of each is vastly
increased.'69 Although it is conceivable that workers in a
single shop might generate a network of tit-for-tat
expectations running among particular individuals, that
66. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1942).
67. Id. at 505-06.
68. Fischl, supra note 27, at 857 ("Judge Hand seems to suggest that the
requisite 'mutual aid' lies not in the promise of reciprocal benefit itself, but
rather in the 'solidarity' that is 'established' by workplace struggles of the sort
fomented by the 'workman's separate grievance.' This view of Hand's reasoning
would . . .bring it in line with the contemporaneous understanding of 'mutual
support'.., as an idea born of working-class experience, at odds with the crude
individualism suggested by the mere promise of reciprocity, and steeped in
notions of community and 'brotherhood.").
69. Peter Cailler Kohler, 130 F.2d at 506.
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possibility becomes implausible among workers separated
by employer, geography, and even-as in Peter Cailler
Kohler-industry. The sympathetic striker or secondary
boycotter "assures himself, in case his turn ever comes," not
that he will be able to cash in obligations from the
particular primary strikers he is assisting, but that the
labor movement's norm of solidarity will remain strong and
workers who are in a position to render assistance will
respect that norm when the time comes.7"
The NLRB's decision in Business Services by
Manpower7' further elucidates this view. Richard Cordes
and Craig Monroe, two workers employed by a temporary
agency, were sent to work at a bakery where they
encountered and refused to cross a picket line. The agency
fired them, and the NLRB ordered reinstatement. The
Board dismissed the contention that because the workers
acted out of "vague ideological reasons" their activity was
unprotected. To the Board, honoring picket lines rested on
"cardinal union principles" not vague ideology.72 Despite the
facts that Cordes and Monroe did not share a union
affiliation or employer with the picketers, that the picketers
were not employed at the bakery, and that the picketers did
not ask Cordes and Monroe to turn back, the Board found
that mutuality was established because, "'[a]lthough
reciprocity may be indirect, respect for another union's
picket line leads to a stronger labor movement."'73 The
Board did not explain further, but the decision appears to
reflect an understanding that the general norm of
respecting picket lines has value in the statutory scheme,
and that the norm would be eroded if workers were to make
case-by-case decisions to follow or violate it based on the
likelihood of gains to themselves individually.
70. See NLRB v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Although reciprocity may be indirect, respect for another union's picket line
leads to a stronger labor movement." (citing Peter Cailler Kohler, 130 F.2d at
505-06)).
71. 272 N.L.R.B. 827 (1984), enforcement denied, 784 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.
1986).
72. Id. at 828.
73. Id. (quoting S. Cal. Edison, 646 F.2d at 1364; see also NLRB v. Union
Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1971) ("It cannot be denied that respect
for the integrity of the picket line may well be the source of strength of the
whole collective bargaining process in which every union member has a
legitimate and protected economic interest.").
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Finally, Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court
in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,74 depicted collective
bargaining as a process driven by solidaristic lawmaking. In
City Disposal Systems, James Brown was fired for refusing
to drive a truck with faulty brakes despite a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement that gave him the right to
turn down unsafe vehicles.75 The employer argued that since
Brown had acted alone, he was not engaged in "concerted
activity" protected by the Act. But in Brennan's view, Brown
was contributing to a collective process of norm creation and
enforcement. "[W]hen an employee invokes a right grounded
in the collective-bargaining agreement, he does not stand
alone," observed Brennan. "Instead, he brings to bear on his
employer the power and resolve of all his fellow
employees."76 Brennan concluded with a sentence that,
given Brown's failure even to mention the collective
bargaining agreement, might appear far-fetched: "It was
just as though James Brown was reassembling his fellow
union members to reenact their decision not to drive unsafe
trucks."77 This assertion is, however, entirely sensible on
Brennan's view that the assembly of workers to enact norms,
along with the subsequent assertion and enforcement of
those norms, is "a single, collective activity"-"beginning
with the organization of a union, continuing into the
negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement, and
extending through the enforcement of the agreement.""
Thus, a worker who stands up to management can
contribute to the enforcement of a norm regardless of
whether she is aware that the norm has been incorporated
into a collective bargaining agreement.
I should confess that my defense of Brennan's opinion is
based partly on personal experience. In the late 1970s, I
worked as a welder in a large shipyard. Each day, our crew
of ten or so welders assembled to receive work assignments.
Our foreman sent us off to different parts of the ship. If our
work location was inclosed, we would pull a "blower," a long
tube connected to an air suction pump located outside, to
74. 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
75. Id. at 839. The analysis presented here builds on insights presented in
Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417, 1427-28 (1984).
76. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 832.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 831-32.
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the job site. If the blower did not reach all the way, or if it
was not working properly, toxic welding fumes would
gradually fill the tank. In that situation, an individual
welder would have to decide whether to proceed with the job
or risk the anger of his or her foreman by refusing. Our
collective bargaining agreement obligated the company to"make provision for the safety and health of its employes
during the hours of their employment," and the regulations
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
included strict standards for shipyards.79 Regardless of the
individual's motivation or knowledge of the standards, each
decision either strengthened or weakened the norm
requiring effective ventilation. During four years in the
yard, I worked for a number of crews, and the strength of
the norm varied tremendously among them. Some foremen
succeeded in packing their crews with "heavy-hitters,"
welders who would focus on production to the exclusion of
health concerns. Others tended to respect the norm,
focusing their efforts on maximizing production once the
health concerns were met. But on every crew, the vitality of
the norm was a day-to-day issue and topic of discussion.
Whenever an individual welder was confronted with the
choice of proceeding without adequate ventilation or
refusing, she could not help but think of co-workers and
their interests and attitudes. Were enough co-workers
enforcing the norm so that her refusal would be expected?
Or were so many "heavy-hitting" that she would be singled
out as a trouble-maker? If she did the work, would crew
members disapprove? And if she refused, would co-workers
back her up, or would they stare at their boots and fidget?
On the facts of City Disposal, the waste haulers were in a
similar situation with regard to unsafe trucks. When James
Brown refused his assignment, his co-workers were on his
mind: "Bob, what [sic] you going to do," he demanded, "put
the garbage ahead of the safety of the men?""° Brennan
sagely omitted this fact from his reasoning; for its absence
would not have changed anything. Brown's question merely
79. Agreement Between General Dynamics Quincy Shipbuilding Division
and Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America
(IUMSWA) and Its Local 5, at 49 (1977) (on file with the author). See OSHA
Regulations for Ship Repairing, Building, and Breaking, 29 C.F.R. pts. 1915-17
(1976).
80. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 827.
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manifested solidaristic thinking that would have been going
on with or without overt verbalization.
A scattering of other cases have produced results that
appear to reflect a positive understanding of solidarity.
Consider two examples. First, in Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB,"l the union established a network of stewards before
it had achieved recognition from the employer. Several
workers were discharged for wearing steward buttons. The
NLRB reinstated them, and the Supreme Court upheld the
reinstatements. Instead of asking whether the steward
buttons provided information necessary for the employees to
make a rational choice for or against unionization, the
Court accepted the Board's conclusion that "the right of
employees to wear union insignia at work has long been
recognized as a reasonable and legitimate form of union
activity." 2 Neither the Court nor the Board explained this
conclusion, which was not at all obvious given the long
tradition of employers discharging workers for wearing such
insignia. From a union point of view, however, the public
display of insignia can alter the balance of power in the
workplace by demonstrating that the union can survive out
in the open. With a steward structure in place, the union
can begin to implement norms of solidarity. Second, in
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 3 the Supreme Court
upheld an order of the NLRB reinstating seven employees
who had walked out in protest of cold on the job without
first notifying their employer. The Court observed that the
workers were "wholly unorganized" and that "they had to
speak for themselves as best they could."' A few workers
had complained individually of cold the day before, but the
extreme conditions on the morning of the protest "finally
brought these workers' individual complaints into concert so
that some more effective action could be considered."8 5
81. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
82. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 802 n.7 (quoting 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187-
88 (1943)).
83. 370 U.S. 9 (1945).
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 15.
676 [Vol. 57
CLASS CONFLICTS II
V. DOCTRINAL CHANGES ENTAILED BY
THE CORE THEORY OF LABOR SOLIDARITY
Unfortunately for workers and unions, decisions like
Peter Cailler Kohler, Business Services by Manpower, and
City Disposal have not given rise to a coherent doctrine or
juridical understanding of solidarity. Peter Cailler Kohler's
norm-based understanding of solidarity has been misread to
require tit-for-tat expectations of individual benefit.86 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce Business
Services by Manpower, finding the discharged workers'
Section 7 interest to be "particularly weak" without even
considering the Board's understanding that "cardinal union
principles" were involved.87  City Disposal's expansive
approach to concerted activity has been limited to the
already unionized workplace, despite the essential role of
norm creation and enforcement prior to union recognition.88
If the Obama NLRB were to build on these decisions,
bringing solidarity back to the center of the labor law, the
official understanding of labor activity would change
dramatically. Consider, for example, the process of union
organizing. If, as posited by the market model of rational
choice, it consists of individual workers gathering
information and choosing between union and non-union
employment relations (the currently dominant
understanding), then there is nothing wrong with reducing
unionization to a one-shot vote for or against union
representation. But if unionization typically proceeds as a
conflict between the employer's norm of individual
competition and the union norm of solidarity, then success
or failure will depend crucially on the ability of workers to
forge solidarity and engage in concerted activity during the
period leading up to union recognition. On this view,
workers come to embrace unionism if they experience
solidarity as empowering, and to reject it if employers
succeed in dividing and discouraging them.89 The employer
86. Fischl supra note 27, at 791-92, 857.
87. Bus. Servs. by Manpower v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 442, 453 (2d Cir. 1986).
88. See Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A
Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673,
1686-87, 1701-02 & n.133 (1989).
89. See Sachs, supra note 32 at 2738, 2743 (suggesting, based on a review of
the economic literature, that workplace organizing follows "self-reinforcing
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attempts to demonstrate its dominance through such tactics
as excluding union organizers from the workplace, ordering
workers to attend anti-union, captive audience speeches,
compelling workers to hear anti-union messages in one-on-
one meetings with their supervisors, "predicting" that the
company will close if the workers organize, and illegally
firing or otherwise retaliating against about one in five
union supporters." The workers respond by organizing
group delegations, "taking over" captive audience meetings,
building support in the community, and-where possible-
staging strikes and job actions. The outcome depends
heavily on the workers' perception of their own capacity for
successful, concerted activity in the face of employer
resistance. The most successful union organizers depict the
organizing process consistently with this view, as do labor
scholars."
This shift from a market to a solidaristic model of
organizing could entail a number of changes in doctrine.
First, the Bush NLRB took the position that the workers'
Section 7 right "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing" is not triggered until
dynamics of success and failure," and that success in the "first stages of
collective action sets in motion social-psychological dynamics that can lead to
further success, while failure at these initial moments can lead to opposite
dynamics and the end of organizational efforts").
90. Beyerstein, supra note 37; see, e.g., LANCE A. COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 18-21, 71-74 (Cynthia
Brown ed., 2000).
91. See FANTASIA, supra note 30, at 121-79 (describing the unionization
process). For additional citations, see Pope, supra note 46, at 1101-02 nn.17-24.
Nobody suggests that this is the only route to unionization, but it does appear to
be the one that: (1) corresponds most closely to the statutory concept of "self-
organization," NLRA Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), (as opposed to unionization
resulting from deals between employers and top union officials, which may come
at the expense of previously organized workers), (2) is most likely to produce a
new union strong enough to retain worker support while negotiating a first
contract, (and thus to carry out the statutory policy of "restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees," NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. §
151 (2006)), and (3) is most likely to produce a new union that operates
democratically, in line with the policy of the Landrum-Griffin Act. See Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 101, 401, 29 U.S.C. §§
411, 481 (2006) (guaranteeing to union members the freedoms of speech and
assembly, and requiring that union officers be selected by a secret-ballot vote of
the membership or by delegates selected by a secret-ballot vote of the
membership).
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a majority of workers select a representative to bargain for
all workers in a unit.92 But this all-or-nothing rule makes no
sense if union organizing consists of a gradual process of
forging solidarity. On this view, a fledgling union typically
establishes its effectiveness prior to achieving majority
support, and the employer's duty to bargain "with the
representatives of his employees"93 should include a duty to
bargain with unions chosen by a minority of workers
concerning the wages and conditions of those workers only.
During the period immediately following enactment of the
NLRA, the negotiation of agreements covering members
only was commonplace, and the statutory text does not
repudiate the practice. 94
Second, the Bush NLRB limited the rule of Weingarten
(according to which a worker has a right to insist upon
having a co-worker present at any meeting with
management that might result in discipline),95 to unionized
workplaces.96 Although the Board engaged in forthright
balancing, it did not consider the role of Weingarten rights
in a non-union workplace where the norm of individual
competition exists in tension with an incipient norm of
solidarity. In such a workplace, when a worker requests to
have a co-worker present, she is invoking the incipient norm
of solidarity. The plight of one worker is a matter of concern
for all. At a minimum, the co-worker can serve as a witness
to the employer's handling of the matter, enabling the
workers to develop their response based on a more accurate
perception of the facts.
Third, and finally, the NLRB long ago held that workers
who join together to regulate their pace of work may be
discharged in spite of the statute's protection of "concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection." The NLRB, which had
previously protected similar activities, accepted the view of
the Courts of Appeal that workers impliedly agreed to follow
employer orders and to forego enacting their own norms
92. Skrzycki, supra note 28 (reporting on advice memo, issued by NLRB
Associate General Counsel Barry Kearney, which stated that the charge against
an employer for failing to bargain with a minority union should be dismissed).
93. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006).
94. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 4-6, 29-30, 82-87 (2005).
95. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260-64 (1975).
96. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004).
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concerning a fair day's work.97 But if unionization proceeds
in a series of contests between employer and union norms,
then this notion of implied contract-imported from the
common law of master and servant--could cripple self-
organization. Workers are reduced to the alternatives of
surrender, of conducting an outside strike (thereby giving
the employer an opportunity to permanently replace pro-
union workers with strike breakers), or of staging
"delegations" and other actions that can be framed as
"presenting grievances" as opposed to implementing
solidaristic norms.98
VI. THE CORE OF SOLIDARISTIC CONTROL
As noted above, the existing labor counterpart to the
core of entrepreneurial control lacks any unifying concept
equivalent to entrepreneurship and exerts little influence
on legal or industrial practice. It does, however, contain the
seed of a more expansive doctrine. Unlike the core of
entrepreneurial control, which draws its substance from the
common law, the core of solidaristic control draws its
substance from the statute. In the leading case of Borg-
Warner, for example, the employer insisted that the union
agree to a "ballot" clause barring future strikes until after
the employer had enjoyed two opportunities to submit
proposals to the workers for secret ballot referenda.99 The
Court held that the ballot clause was a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining, and thus that the employer had
violated the NLRA by insisting on it as a condition for
agreement upon other, mandatory subjects."0 In part, the
Court reasoned that the ballot clause "substantially
modifies the collective-bargaining system provided for in the
statute" by "enabl[ing] the employer, in effect, to deal with
its employees rather than with their statutory
representative."' 0' In support of this proposition, the Court
cited Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. NLRB, a case in
which the employer was held to have violated the Act by
97. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 335-39 (1950).
98. Pope, supra note 46, at 1113-14.
99. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342, 343-46 (1958).
100. Id. at 349-50.
101. Id. at 350.
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dealing directly with its employees instead of their union. 1 2
The Court's positive valuation of the union's ability to
represent the workers parallels its positive valuation of"entrepreneurial control," with the statute replacing the
common law as the source of values to be protected.
In Borg-Warner itself, this reasoning was not essential
to the holding; the Court's alternative ground that the
"ballot" clause involved "relations between the employees
and their unions" and not between employees and employer
was sufficient to support the result.' °" In later cases,
however, it became clear that the classification of a subject
as non-mandatory would rarely, by itself, suffice to protect a
union decision against employer pressure, and sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) came to play a vital role."° This is
because the classification of a subject as non-mandatory
merely removes that subject from the scope of mandatory
collective bargaining, returning the right of control to
whichever party enjoys it under the common law."0 5 And
because the common law gives the employer the sole rights
to possess, use, transfer, and exclude others (including
workers) from the workplace, that controlling party is
almost always the employer. (Borg-Warner itself was a rare
exception, where the common law allocated the matter at
issue-the union's process for assessing employer contract
proposals-to the unilateral control of the union.')
Consider, for example, the case of Frankline Inc.107 In
Frankline, the union notified the company that Gladys Cook
had been elected steward of the upholstery department, but
the company refused to recognize her and announced that it
would continue to recognize the previous steward instead.
102. Id. (citing Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944)).
103. Id. at 349-50.
104. NLRA § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006). These sections
state that it is an "unfair labor practice" for employers to interfere with the
exercise of Section 7 rights or to discriminate based on union membership.
105. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971) (employer's unilateral reduction of health
insurance benefits for currently retired employees did not violate the statute
because such benefits are a permissive subject of bargaining).
106. The employer could not unilaterally implement its proposal for the
simple reason that it lacked control over the union's internal decision-making
process.
107. 287 N.L.R.B. 263 (1987).
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The administrative law judge held that the subject of
steward selection was a mandatory subject of bargaining,
and therefore the company had violated section 8(a)(5) by
unilaterally terminating its policy of recognizing the union's
choice of stewards. °8 But if steward selection were a
mandatory subject of bargaining, then the employer would
be privileged to insist upon its choice of stewards as a
condition for concluding a collective bargaining agreement.
Accordingly, the NLRB took the contrary view and ruled
that steward selection is a non-mandatory subject.' 9
Without more, however, that ruling would have left the
employer free to implement unilaterally its policy of
recognizing only stewards of which it approved. (Under the
common law, employers enjoyed unilateral control over who
they would deal with, just as they did over plant closings
and other matters at the core of entrepreneurial control.) To
solve this problem, the NLRB invoked Borg Warner: "An
employer's insistence to impasse on a proposal regarding
employees' choice of bargaining representative generally
violates Sec. 8(a)(5) for the twofold reason that it 'settles no
term or condition of employment' and that it 'weaken [s] the
independence of the "representative" chosen by the
employes [sic].""' Without the second reason, the employer
would have been freed of the duty to bargain without any
obligation to refrain from exercising its common law
prerogative to deal with whomsoever it pleased. With it, the
NLRB carved out a zone of unilateral union control that is
independent of the common law baseline.
If the NLRB were to define a core of solidaristic control,
the shaping of steward systems would be an obvious
candidate for inclusion. Given that the employer enjoys
unilateral control over the structure of supervision, one
might expect the union to enjoy equivalent control over the
structure of representation. The shape of a steward system
can exert a huge impact on union cohesion and
effectiveness. Where stewards are numerous and accessible,
members tend to be more active, more loyal to the union,
108. Id. at 272.
109. Id. at 264 n.8.




and more likely to enforce solidaristic norms."' Prior to the
NLRA, unions unilaterally established steward systems and
enacted rules requiring workers to deal with the employer
through their stewards, and not directly.1 2 It is true that,
just as workers are directly affected by the structure of
supervision, management is directly affected by steward
structures. But allowing management to exert economic
power to force changes in union steward structures makes
no more sense than allowing unions to force changes in
supervisory structures. In each case, the party exerting
power has a strong interest in weakening the system at
issue.
In the automobile industry, for example, the United
Automobile Workers (UAW) convinced most of the major
employers to recognize its unilaterally established steward
systems, which typically included one steward for each
foreman. General Motors, however, refused to recognize the
stewards and successfully insisted on dealing with its
workers through far less numerous committeemen. 3 As a
result, GM's industrial relations system quickly became
more bureaucratic and centralized, to the detriment of
worker involvement and union responsiveness. Moreover,
because of its leading position in the industry, General
Motors "seemed the model upon which others in heavy
industry must either mold their internal work regime or
face extinction.""' Eventually, the other companies forced
their unions to accept systems of grievance processing
modeled on GM's."5 By controlling the union's structure of
representation, GM was able to undermine membership
involvement and solidarity throughout the industry.
111. For citations to the social science literature, see Pope, supra note 46, at
1118-22 & nn.81-101.
112. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Wartime Labor Regulation, the Industrial
Pluralists, and the Law of Collective Bargaining, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 142, 153 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John
Harris eds., 1993); Midland Shop Rules, reprinted in Hartley W. Barclay, We
Sat Down With the Strikers and General Motors, MILL & FACTORY, Feb. 1937, at
46 (describing process as typical).
113. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Great Expectations: The Promise of Industrial
Jurisprudence and Its Demise, 1930-1960, in INDuSTIAL DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, supra note 111, at 113, 124.
114. Id. at 138.
115. Id. at 138-39.
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It is also possible that the workers' determination
whether to organize should be located within the core of
solidaristic control.'16 If unions are banned from using
economic power to influence employer decisions concerning
the "basic scope of the enterprise," then it would seem that
employers should be banned from using their economic
power to influence worker decisions about whether to
organize. On this view, it would be unlawful for the
employer to use enterprise property and supervisory
structures (as opposed to expression through public
channels like mass media) to force its anti-union message
on employees. Captive audience meetings, compulsory anti-
union campaigning by supervisors, and one-on-one anti-
union meetings with supervisors would be banned under
section 8(a)(1).
CONCLUSION
In the words of NLRB Member Wilma Liebman,
American labor law has been turned "inside out." The focus
of labor jurisprudence has been on the exceptions to
workers' statutory rights instead of the rights themselves.
Business values-imported from outside the NLRA-have
gravitated to the core of labor jurisprudence, while labor
values-originally enshrined at the heart of the statute-
have floated to the periphery. The present essay argues that
this reversal reflects the absence of a positive, juristic
understanding of worker self-organization and concerted
activity. While business values are grounded on a deeply
rooted core theory and narrative of entrepreneurship,
exemplified in the doctrine of the "core of entrepreneurial
control," there is no labor equivalent. In its absence, legal
decision-makers envision workers as rationally self-
interested market actors-an approach drawn from the
market in commodities, home of entrepreneurship.
The Essay proposes that labor's counterpart to business
entrepreneurship is labor solidarity. Just as capital-and
control over capital-is central to business
entrepreneurship, so is solidarity-and the generation and
enforcement of solidaristic norms-central to the statutorily
protected activities of "self-organization" and "concerted
activity for . . . mutual aid or protection." When legal
116. I am indebted to Kenneth Dau-Schmidt for this suggestion.
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decision-makers conceptualize workers as rationally self-
interested market actors, they take the employer's side in
what amounts to a culture war between individualism and
solidarity in the workplace. While entrepreneurship fits the
model of self-interested rational choice, solidarity is better
explained by the model of constitutive choice, according to
which individuals make decisions based not on calculations
of individual gain, but on self-identification (e.g., as the kind
of person who stands by her co-workers). Labor solidarity
can be traced back to historical origins and legal sources
that parallel those of entrepreneurship. The juristic
understanding of entrepreneurship arose out of the customs
and unofficial common law of business, which were
incorporated by judges into the official common law.
Solidarity arose out of the customs and unofficial common
law of labor, which were incorporated by legislators into a
series of statutes culminating in the NLRA. If our labor law
is to be turned rightside-out, we will need to develop a
positive juristic understanding of solidarity, including a core
theory and narrative of the generation of solidaristic norms.
Elements of such an understanding can be found in
scattered decisions of the NLRB and courts, but they
remain to be assembled and fleshed out.
At the beginning of this Essay, President Obama was
quoted honoring "the selflessness of workers who would
rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job."
Union organizer Mia Giunta, who assisted a group of
workers in developing and enforcing a work-sharing norm,
had this to say about the tradition of labor solidarity: "I get
really angry when it is said that working-class people don't
have culture. They have a very deep culture. It's a culture
that's based on solidarity and trust and helping each other,
and a dream for a better life for your children." ' It remains
to be seen whether our labor jurisprudence can comprehend
and embrace the essential role of this culture in worker self-
organization and concerted activity, or whether the values
of rationally self-interested individualism, drawn from the
culture of business, will continue to dominate our labor law.
117. Giunta, supra note 8, at 36.
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